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Kloepfer, and Ronald V.
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Gravel Co.,
Defendants & Respondents.

Case No. 7897

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial
District of the State ot Utah, in and for
the County of Cache.
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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
Effie Cole,
Plaintiff & Appellant,
-vsFred J. Kloepfe!, Elden J.
Kloepfer, and Ronald V.
Butters, doing business in the
Firm name of Kloepfer Sand &
Gravel Co.,
Defendants & Respondents.

Case No. 7897

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ST.A.TEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal arises out of judgment of dismissal
with prejudice at the close of plaintiff's case.
The plaintiff in this case is a woman 75 years of age
(R 34) who was walking west on the north side of Third
South Street, Logan, Utah on or about the 8th day of
October, 1949, at about 5 p.m. of said day, when at
about 263 East on said Third South Street, she caught
the toe of her shoe on an abrupt rise in the sidewalk
causing her to trip and break her knee cap in 3 or 4
places, (R 35, 36).
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Plaintiff lived at 163 East on said Third South
Street and was familiar with the defect (R 35). At the
time of the accident the plaintiff had stepped onto the
"center piece" (R 35) (R 36) which consisted of a
block of cement sidewalk that had previously been
torn up as part of the sidewalk in order to put in
water and sewer lines at a house lying on the north
side of said walk (R 22). This cement block formed
part of the refill in backfilling said trench and was
about 3 inches above the surrounding back-fill (R 24),
and about in the center of the ten foot by 5 foot
sidewalk that had been taken out (R 23). There were
other cement blocks also that had been used in the
backfilling which also protruded above the surrounding
dirt and gravel (R 24). The dirt and gravel was left
about lYz inches below the abutting pavement at the
time of the backfill (R 24). That the condition continued to exist until the time of the accident except
that the dirt settled somewhat (R 25). That prior
to the excavation it "was all good cement like it
ought to be" (R 34).
Plaintiff testified (and there was no evidence to
the contrary) that as she stepped on the said "center
piece" there was a car passing awfully fast and just
about then there were some children down the block,
and they let out an awful yell and I naturally looked
up to see if they were run over or hurt. I tripped my
toe on this high place going up onto the good sidewalk.
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I broke my knee cap in three or four places" (R 36).
Thereafter and until the thne of the trial she had to
use crutches or cane in order to get around (R 37).
It was stipulated by counsel that the doctor would
testify that plaintiff would be incapacitated for life
because of the injury sustained (R 59). It may be
added that she was alert to the condition of the sidewalk at the time she started- across the rough and
uneven portion in question (R 36).
The defendants admit in their pleading that they
dug and backfilled the trench in question but allege
it was done in a careful manner (R 6). However, when
plaintiff's husband first saw _the backfill the dirt was
still soft and the cement blocks were somewhat embedded in the soft dirt. This was, as he figured it,
about 2 days after the work was done (R 22). That
right after the backfill the cement block was seen
''sticking up there'' and the big block was about 10
or 12 inches square,- which was ·either the· day of the
completion of the job or the morning of the next day
(R 5, 51, 52, 53). No permit, as was required by
Logan City Ordinance, was taken out for the digging
of the trench as the record shows no proof of the same.
The complaint alleges that the defendants backfilled the said trench so as to leave a public nuisance
(R 1). The evidence adduced, and as above outlined
shows that this is the case under the laws of the State
of Utah. l\ public nuisance, as defined by section 103Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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41-3 Utah Revised Statutes, 1943, reads: "A public
nuisance consists in the unlawful doing of any act, or
omitting to perform any duty which act or omission
either, 1, Annoys, injures or endangers the comfort,
repose, health or safety of three or more persons, or
2. Unlawfully interferes with, obstructs or renders
dangerous for passage any lake, stream, canal or basin
or any public park, street or highway.''
On motion for dismissal at the time of the trial,
plaintiff asked the Court on what ground it placed
or would place the dismissal and the Court said on the
ground of contributory negligence of the plaintiff (R
59, 60). It thereafter, at the conclusion of the plaintiff's
evidence dismissed the action with prejudice (R 66) and
entered judgment accordingly (R 10). However, in the
Findings the Court below enlarges upon the cause for
dimissal by adding that any act done by the defendants
was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury, and
as eonclusions of law the Court bases it's dismissal also
on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to prove
it was the defendants duty to maintain the sidew:alk in
a safe condition (R 8, 9). And in it's judgment of dismissal ~ the Court reiterates these grounds of dismissal (R 10).
POINT 1
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING AS A MATTER
OF LAW THAT PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIG:BJNT.
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POINT 2

THE COlTRrr, ERRED IN RULING AS A MATTER
OF L.A.\\T 1"HAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE
THAT THE DEFENDANTS, OR ANY OF THEIR
EMPLOYEES WERE GUILTY OF ANY ACT OR
~-\CTS

WHICH WERE THE PROXIMATE CAUSE

O:B., THE ACCIDENT AND PLAINTIFF'S CONSEQUENT INJURY.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING AS A MATTER
OF LAw THAT PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENrr.
That there was negligence on the part of the defendants in backfilling the trench that had pr~viously been
dug by them across the sidewalk is not ·open to/ doubt.
rrhe record of the testimony submitted to the Court
below shows that the cement.. sidewalk for a distance
of 10 feet in length and ·five feet in width was taken up
(R 23), and that there was left as the result of backfill-.
ing an extremely rough and uneven surface in that
there was a drop of from lYz to 3 inches from the abutting pavement as found by the Court below. Added to
this there 'vas one large block of cement that was left
protruding upward about 3 inches from the immediate
surrounding ground of the backfill together with other
smaller pieces of block cement (R 24). That the conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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dition ren1ained about the same until the time of the
accident ( 25) .
. Keeping ,these facts in mind can anyone doubt but
what this condition was a public nuisance as defined
by our statutes heretofor quoted, the same being created
and maintained by the defendants and in violation of
the Logan City Ordinance quoted in plaintiff's complaint.
The question then seems to be whether or not the
plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of
law even though she had many times prior to the time
of the accident and injury passed over or near the rough
and uneven backfilling and knew of it's existence and
was aiert to it at the very time she attempted to
pass over it on the 8th day of October~
The cases so far as we have been able to ascertain
hold that such a person is not guilty ·?f contributory
negligence. It will be remembered that at the time she
attempted to cross some children were in the street

.

· west of plaintiff, that a fast moving automobile was
. going west, · the same direction as the plaintiff, and
that said children yelled and said plaintiff thought
one or more of them had been injured and therefore
loo~ed up (R 36). That she was distracted from the
rough place in question, we believe is established for
sh~ was startled ( R 61). Would not a;nyone be startled
and distracted under these circumstances~ We believe
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they "rould.

. .\s to "rhether or not one Is contributory negligent
under the facts of this case is one of fact to be passed
on by the jury. Smith vs. City of Tacoma, 163 Wash.
626, 1 Pac. (2) 870, 871

i~

a case in point. There the

plaintiff 'Yas familiar with the hazardous place in the
walk prior to the accident. In this case the defendant
contended that they should have judgment nqtwithstanding the verdict of the jury, but the Supreme Court
of Washington refused, saying:
"~~he

mere fact that the appellant was aware
of the defective condition· .of the sidewalk when
the accident occurred is not per se conclusive of
negligence on his part, though it was competent
evidence on the question of contributory negligence.*** All that the law required was the exercise of such care and caution as a person of
ordinary prudence would rise under similar circumstances. ''
we do not believe that defendants can find a well
considered case that prior knowledge of defect alone
is· sufficient to charge or hold plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence when there is such a distraction
as oecured in the instant case. And we maintain that
the case of Eisner vs. Salt Lake City, 238 Pac. (2) 416
does not so hold, but holds that there was not such
an unusual distraction as to absolve her from such a
charge nor 'vas the plaintiff in that case alert to her
immediate surro~ndings.
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In the case of Denton vs. Twin Falls, 54 Idaho 35,

28 Pac. (2) 202, 203 we have a case pertaining to a
·rough and uneyen sidewalk. Plaintiff in response tD
questions answered thus:
'' ' Q. Yes, You had the two young ladies

with you, and you knew that this place was very
dangerous; but you were not paying very much
attention to the girls; and yet you think you must
have forgotten about that place~ Is that correct~
· A. Well, I had crossed over the place a number
of times and had got kind of used to going over
it; yet I knew that anyone had to take especial
care in going over that place without stumbling
and falling.'
" 'Q~ And what happened when you got up
in the immediate vicinity of this 812 Fourth
Avenue West, Mr. Denton~ A. Well, I was just
walking along there and I carne up by No. 812,
and there was some boys out there in the yard
playing and holloring, and just as I went to
pass over this break'one of them yelled out, and
it kind of startled me .and I looked around to
.see what was gqi~g on, and the . thing that I
next knew I was getting up.'

" 'Q. Well, what I am trying to get at, Mr.
Denton, what was the reason that you lost your
footing and fell~ A. Well, I stumped my foot
over this broken place there in the walk and fell.'
'' 'Q. Now, you stated to your counsel, in
answer to a question that there was some outcry
or some yell from some of the children playing
in a yard nearby. Do you remember that' A.
Yes, sir. ' "
·
As in the instant case the defendant requested a
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nonsuit whieh "Tas denied and on appeal to the Supreme
Court of Idaho, the Court there said :
''Touching the question of temporary forgetfulness, in another 'sidewalk' case, Butland v.
Caldwell, 51 Idaho, 483, 488, 6 P. (2nd) 493, 496,
this court expressed itself as follows: 'Temporary forgetfulness, inattention, or distraction do
not generally constitute contributory negligence.
'When a person has exercised t~e care and caution which an ordinarly prudent person would
have exercised under the same or similar circumstances, he is not negligent merely· because
he temporarily forgot or was inattentive to a
known danger'. 45 C.J. 950, and! authorities cited.
Ordinary care is all that is required. 45 C.J. 947,
949, and authorities cited. Osier v. Consumers'
Co., 42 Idaho, 789, 796, 248 P. 438; Giffen v. ·City
of Lewiston, 6 Idaho, 231, 55 P. 545.' ''
In Cox vs. City of Coffeyville, 153 Kansas 392, 110
Pac. (2) 772, the Supreme Court reversed a ruling by
a lower court which had sustained a demurrer to plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff was walking on the sidewalk
and when he~ came alongside of the hole· in the sidewalk
into which he fell, he met one Moore carrying an armload of groceries. 1\ioore passed plaintiff so close that
plaintiff fell into the hole. There was no evidence that
~ioore bu1nped plaintiff into the hole, but only that he
passed close to plaintiff and plaintiff stepped aside to
avoid a collision and fell into the hole. At the time plaintiff was living within 40 feet of the hole, knew of its
existence fro1n the many times that he had walked
along the sidev.ralk, and immediately prior to meeting
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him, was walking to the side of the hole. The Kansas
Court stated the general principle that the mere knowledge on the part of the plaintiff did not conclusively
show contributory negligence, and then cited an earlier
case entitled City of Olathe vs. Mizee, 48 Kan.
435, 29 P. 754, 3 Am. ·st. Rep. 308, which set forth
the principle and general rule that a person whose
faculties of observa~ion or memory are temporarily
distracted as regards a dangerous condition is virtually
in the same rnental position as .one who has never acquired knowledge of such dangerous condition. Plaintiff subInits that the Cox case sets forth sound, applicable
principles of law and should be adopted by this court
and made the law of Utah.
In the support of the general principle, the Kansas
Court cites 13 A.L.R. 87, wherein excuses for failure
to observe and a void defect or obstruction is annotated.
Three basic cases set forth the principle and are cited
in the annotation. ·They are: Thomas v. New York, 28
Hun.( N.Y.) 110; Barr v. Fairfax, 156 Mo. App. 295,
137 S.W. 631; Kenyon v. Mondovi, 98 Wis. 50, 73 N.W.
314.
In Thon1as v. New York, it was ruled that a person
'vhose attention was diverted from a dangerous condition by a crowd was not guilty of contributory negligence as ·n1atter of law.
In Barr v. Fairfax the approach of another person
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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diverted plaintiff' 8 attention from the defect.
In I~enyon v . .Jiondovi the pedestrian's atte.ntion was
diverted by being accosted by a friend.
Three California eases 'vhich "involve somewhat simjlar facts and 'vhich applied the principle .for which
plaintiff here contends are Barry v. Terkildsen 72 Cal. .
25":!:, 13 P. 657, 40 P. 555 ;\'"an Praag v. ?-ale, 107 Cal. 438;
De \Tal v. Boos Bros. Cafeteria So., 45 Cal,App 377,
187 P. 767.
In Barry v. Terkildsen plaintiff's attention was attracted to some children playing in the street at the
1non1ent she stepped into the open hole. The court held
that she 'vas not guilty of contributory negligence as
Inatter of law.
In Van Praag v. Gale plaintiff was reading a newspaper and walked into an open doorway. The question
of contributory negligence was again ruled as one of
fact for the jury to decide.
In Du \Tal v. Broos Bros. Cafteria Co. plaintiff
fell into an open elevator shaft at a time when her
attention was attracted to something she was passing
on the highway. Again the question of contributory
negligence 'vas properly submitted to the jury. At page
769 the court sets forth the following interesting statcInent of fact and principles applicable:
''In the present case the respondent testified that when 10 or 12 feet from the elevator
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doors she saw they were closed. Her attention being attracted to something she was passing, she
turned her head, and as she walked that short
distance, one of the doors was rai$ed from the
pitfall directly in her pathway and into which
she fell .
·
As was said in the optnion in Van Praag v. Gale:
" 'To some minds probably the conclusion
would seem irresistible that he who, with eyes
to see, in broad daylight walks into an . open
trapdoor in the sidewalk is lacking in that care
and caution which charactrize the man of ordinary prudence. Others may well reason that plaintiff was entitled to a safe passage over a walk
prepared by the public for the accomodation of
all its citizens.'
''The fact that different minds might reach
different conclusions upon the question of the
respondent's caution disposes of all the contentions of the appellants based on the assumption
that contributory negligence was shown as a
matter of law, as well as their contentions regarding the instructions on the subject given
and refused. Mere abstraction on the part of a
pedistrian does not constitute contributory negligence. Robinson v. Pioche, 5 Cal. 461; Perkins
v. Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co., 155 Cal. 722, 103 Pac.
190. Th question of contributory negligeRce wa~
properly submitted to the jury under correct
instructions. ' '
Numerous other cases which discussed other types
of distractions and 'vhich hold that such distractions are
sufficient to make a jury question on the matter of contributory negligence are cited and discussed at 70 A.L.R.
1388.
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It will thus be seen from the above authorities that
in cases such as the in8tant one the question of contributory negligence is one for the JUry.

POINT 2
THE COlTRT ERRED IN RULING AS A MATTER
OF LAW 'rHAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE,
THAT THE DEFENDANT, OR ANY OF THEIR
E~iPLOYEES, WERE GUILTY OF ANY ACT OR
.A.CTS WHICH WERE THE PROXIMATE CAUSE
OF THE ACCIDENT AND CONSEQUENT INJURY.
In the judgment (R 10) the Court below laid down
this ruling but in the conclusions of Law (R 9) the
Court held that plaintiff was precluded from recovery
for failure to establish by any evidence a duty on part
of the defendants at the time and place of accident to
maintain the sidewalk in a safe condition.
Of course it is not plaintiff's contention that if
the defendants had backfilled as required by the Logan
City Ordinance as set out in our pleading and as proved,
and had not created a public nuisance, that if the sidewalk thereafter became in disrepair through no fault
of defendants that they would be liable. But we do contend that defendants having created a public nuisance
as the record sho\vs, it was their duty to obviate the
same and as they did not so do they are liable under
the facts of this cause to plaintiff.
As has been pointed out in our statement of facts
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and which is substantiated by the record the defen-·
dants after digging the trench backfilled it by the use
of a bulldozer leaving in the center of the backfill a cement block 10 by 12 inches in dimension
and which was about 3 inches above the surrounding
soil and gravel (R23) with smaller protruding blocks
of cement surrounding the large one (R24). And as
has been shown this condition was shown to exist
up to the time of the accident (R25). Plaintiff's husband
saw this condition 2 days after it's creation (R22) and
witness Sjoberg saw it the same day of it's creation or
the next morning (R50, 51, 52, 53). That a past condition may be inferred from proof of a present condition
in a case as this one will not, we believe, be controverted
for this is the law laid down in 31 C.J.S. pp. 790,
Sec. 140 with numerous citations.
The record fails to disclose that a permit was taken ·
out for the digging of said trench and consequently the
s~ia'' digging was in violation of positive law which
is in and of itself negligence. See Millsp~ugh v. Alert
Transfer & Storage Co., 259 Pac. 22, 23, 145 Washington
111. It constitutes negligence per se. See Central Railroad & B. Co., v. Srnith, 3 S.E. 397. Kavanagh v. Ne·w
York & W. Ry. Co., 187 N.Y. 859, 860 196, App. Div. 384.
That the condition created bythe defendants and allowed
to remain constituted a public nuisance we believe is
well proven for as has been noticed plaintiff herself
would sometimes go around the place due to it's roughSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ness and hazardous condition ( R35). ...t\.nd other people
had also had falls at the sa1ne place because of said
condition there existing (R31, 32).
It 'vas held in the case of Christie v. Mutual Grocery
Co., 194 .A. 225, 227, 119 N.J. La'v 147, that any obstruction unnecessarily impeding the la,vful use of a street
by the public 'vas a nuisance 'vhich would render creator
liable for accident resulting therefrom.
As has been heretofore noted the uneven and rough
surface of the backfill was first noticed by the plaintiff's husband within two days after the backfill and was
also seen by witness Sjobreg, who, by the way, was
the owner of the property for which the trench was dug,
the evening of its completion or the next morning. The
inference is therefore inexcapable that the condition was
so left by the defendants and the Court below so found
(R8, 9). The fact that the Court found as a conclusion
that the same did not constitute a public nuisance is
entirely at variance with the. finding of fact by the
court for it found that, ''at one place was below the
surface of the abutting walk approximately 2 or 3
inches." That conclusion is certainly at variance with
the evidence adduced by the plaintiff and there was
nothing in the record to the contrary. That the rough
condition created by the negligence of defendants was
the approximate cause of accident and injury is we believe well established. However, we are of the opinion
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that the defendants are estopped from raising point no. 2
here set forth for they did not raise it as grounds for
dismissal and or stated before the court placed the
dismissal on the sole ground of contributory negligence
at the trial.
CONCLUSIONS
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the Court should
1·everse the decision of the trial court and remand the
plaintiff's cause of action to the District Court for a
new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
Harvey A. Sjostrom
Attorney for Plaintiff
Appellant.
153 North Main, Logan, Utan
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